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I. Introduction - Indian Preference Exemption of Title VII
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire any individual on the
basis of race or national origin.' However, Indian tribes, along with the United
States and certain governmental agencies, are specifically exempt from the
definition of employer.2 This allows an Indian tribe to discriminate in its hiring
practices by hiring or refusing to hire individuals on the basis of their race or
national origin. Title VII provides specifically that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any
publicly announced employment practice of such business or
enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any
individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.3
As a result, Indian tribes and businesses operating on or near Indian
reservations may give preference to Indians in their employment practices.
Both the Indian Exemption and the "on or near" the reservation exemption
for businesses have been upheld by the Supreme Court and are clearly
* Peabody Western Coal Company filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc,
which was denied on May 18, 2005. Peabody filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on
September 15, 2005. The petition for a writ of certiorari was distributed for a conference vote
on January 20, 2006. The petition was denied on January 23, 2006. See http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/docket/05-353.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
** J.D. 2006, cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center; B.S., 2000, St. Lawrence
University. First place winner, 2005-2006 American lndian Law Review Writing Competition.
The author would like to acknowledge Prof. Reid Chambers, adjunct professor of Federal Indian
Law at Georgetown University Law Center and partner at Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse,
Endreson & Perry, LLP, for his continued help and encouragement in drafting this paper.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000). Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis
of color, religion, or sex.
2. Id. § 2000e(b).
3. Id. § 2000e(b)(i).
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enshrined in federal law. In a unanimous decision, Morton v. Mancari,4 the
Supreme Court explained the legislative purpose behind the Indian Exemption
as an indicia of "Congress' recognition of the longstanding federal policy of
providing a unique legal status to Indians in matters concerning tribal or 'on or
near' reservation employment."5  At issue in that case was the Indian
employment preference authorized by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,6
which provided an employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA).7 After the passage of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act of 1972,8 non-Indian employees of the BIA brought a class
action claiming that the Indian employment preference used by the BIA
violated the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 and deprived the
class members of property rights without due process of law in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.9 The Court held that the Indian hiring and employment
preference was not invalidated by Congress with the passage of the 1972 Act.
In stating its holding, the Court relied on four factors: (1) the Indian Exemption
in Title VII, (2) two Indian preference laws passed within months of the 1972
Act, (3) historical exemption of Indian preference laws from Executive Orders
forbidding employment discrimination in the federal government, and (4) the
cannon barring repeals by implication.°
The contours of the Indian Exemption and the "on or near" exemption
indicate that Indian tribes and businesses operating on or near a reservation may
facially discriminate." This would be consistent with the federal legislative
purpose of the Indian Exemption in improving the employment situation of
Indians in general. 2 Many tribes also have tribal affiliation employment
4. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
5. Id. at 547-48.
6. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2000).
7. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 543.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2000).
9. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 539.
10. Id. at 547-49.
11. See generally Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 713 (1 st Cir. 1999); Dille
v. Council of Energy Res. Tribes, 801 F.2d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1986); Wardle v. Ute Indian
Tribe, 623 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1980).
12. After the 1994 amendments to the ISDA, the statute now states:
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), with respect to any self-determination
contract, or portion of a self-determination contract, that is intended to benefit one
tribe, the tribal employment or contract preference laws adopted by such tribe
shall govern with respect to the administration of the contract or portion of the
contract.




preferences. In 1985, the Navajo Nation enacted the Navajo Employment
Preference Act, 3 which requires that "all employers doing business within the
territorial jurisdiction [or near the boundaries] of the Navajo Nation, or engaged
in any contract with the Navajo Nation, shall give preference in employment to
Navaj os.''4 Tribal specific employment preferences are, however, in conflict
with some of the policies behind the enactment of Title VII.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) took note of the
conflict, between the Congressional policy of promoting Indian self-governance
and the spread of discrimination in the form of tribal affiliation employment
preferences, in a 1988 Policy Statement. 5 For those Indian tribes and
employers situated on or near reservations where only one Indian tribe resides,
the Indian Exemption will prove an advantage to the members of that tribe and
that tribe alone. For those tribes and employees living near a reservation where
more than one tribe share the reservation or where there are adjacent
reservations, "[t]he potential inequities resulting from according a preference
based on tribal affiliation are most clearly evident when these circumstances are
contemplated." 6 The EEOC recognizes that its determination of enforcing
Title VII against employers for using tribal employment preferences is limited
to employers covered by Title VII and not "Indian tribes which are expressly
exempt from the provisions of the Act under Section 701 (b)(1),,17 and thus the
tribes, as employers, may continue to discriminate on the basis of tribal
membership or affiliation. The EEOC's 1988 Policy Statement on Indian
Preference Under Title VII and its conclusion that tribal affiliation or
membership discrimination is not allowed under Title VII first became an issue
a decade later in Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agriculture Improvement
and Power District.1
8
The facts of Dawavendewa I are strikingly similar to those in Peabody 11.19
The Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (Salt
River) operates the Navajo Generating Station on reservation land leased from
13. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 15, §§ 601-619 (2005).
14. Id. § 604.
15. Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. (Dawavendewa
1), 154 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing EEOC: Policy Statement on Indian Preference




19. See infra Part II for the facts in EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (Peabody I), 400
F.3d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 2005).
No. 1]
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the Navajo Nation.2" The lease between Salt River and the Navajo Nation
contains a Navajo employment preference clause similar to the Navajo
employment preference clause in Peabody."' Dawavendewa, a member of the
Hopi Tribe, applied for employment at the Navajo Generating Station but was
not selected for employment, allegedly because he is not a member of the
Navajo Nation.22 Dawavendewa filed a Title VII national origin discrimination
suit against Salt River but did not assert any claims of discrimination against the
Navajo Nation or any tribal officials. 23 The District Court of Arizona dismissed
the Title VII claim for a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 24 The Ninth Circuit reversed the Arizona court's decision, recognizing
a claim for national origin discrimination based on tribal membership.25
The EEOC filed an amicus brief in support of Dawavendewa. 6 The EEOC
stressed Title VII's focus on eradicating the "disparate treatment encountered
by the individual" '27 and although there is an Indian Exemption to Title VII, the
statute allows for preferencing an individual because he is Indian and not
because of tribal membership. The problem of"'intragroup' discrimination is,
if anything, even more pronounced in this context, given the extent to which
each Indian tribe has its own separate identity., 2' The EEOC argued that each
Tribe has its own separate identity and thus, discriminating against an Indian,
because of his tribal membership constitutes national origin discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. 29 Finally, the EEOC noted that Dawavendewa was not
claiming discrimination by the Navajo Nation but rather by Salt River, which
is an employer covered by Title VII.3 °




24. Id. at 1119.
25. Id. at 1125.
26. Brief for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae,
Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. (Dawavendewa 1), 154
F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-15803), 1997 WL 33546985.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Id. at 13-14.
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id. at 7. The Navajo Nation has a Navajo employment preference as a tribal ordinance.
However, it is not the Navajo Nation that is attempting to enforce the ordinance, but rather a
private non-Indian employer. The Ninth Circuit has addressed the question "whether a tribe
possesses that authority to require a 'non-Indian' employer to comply with a tribal ordinance"
but did not decide it in Arizona Public Service Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (9th Cir.




The court of appeals reversed the district court and remanded, holding that
Salt River's Navajo employment preference "constitutes 'national origin'
discrimination under Title VII and does not fall within the scope of the Indian
Preference exemption. ' '3' In support of its conclusion that under Title VII,
national origin discrimination based on tribal preference, is a claim for which
relief may be granted, the court looked to a broad array of sources. Title VII
fails to define the term "national origin." However, the court noted that the
legislative history, Supreme Court precedent, and regulations implementing
Title VII "provide that discrimination on the basis of one's ancestors' "place of
origin" - not nation of origin - is sufficient to come within the scope of the
statute."32 Having determined that national origin covers the nation or "place
of origin," the court analogized cases recognizing claims for national origin
discrimination against individuals whose nation of origin no longer exists.33
This concept of national origin covers Indian nations, as the former Chief
Justice Marshall wrote: "The Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.... The
Cherokee nation, then is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described ... ."" For this reason, the court had no
trouble concluding that "differential employment treatment based on tribal
affiliation is actionable as 'national origin' discrimination under Title VII."'3s
In holding that national origin discrimination covers discrimination based on
tribal membership, the court distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in
Morton v. Mancari that tribal membership is a political affiliation rather than
national origin or race.36 In Morton v. Mancari, in addition to holding that the
31. Dawavendewal, 154 F.3dat 1124.
32. Id. at 1119. The court cited Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973),
which noted that the term national origin refers to the country both in which a person was born
and from which his or her ancestors came. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1980) (stating that national
origin discrimination includes discrimination "because of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's
place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics
of a national origin group").
33. Dawavendewa I, 154 F.3d at 1119-20; see Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d
667 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing Serbian as a nationality which is covered under Title VII);
Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instr. Div., 494 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980) (recognizing
discrimination against "Cajuns" as national origin discrimination under Title VII although the
colony of Acadia no longer exists).
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Indian employment preference had not been overruled by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Supreme Court held that Indian
employment preference in the BIA did not violate the Due Process clause
because of the unique BIA interest in employing Indians generally.37 The
Supreme Court made it clear that the Indian employment preference in the BIA
was related to Indian self-governance, closely tailored only to employment in
Indian services, based primarily on the political affiliations of Indians as tribal
members.38 Based on the fact that Morton v. Mancari did not involve a claim
of discrimination based on particular tribal membership and did not involve a
Title VII discrimination claim, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the holding that
tribal membership was a political affiliation from its holding that tribal
membership qualified as national origin under Title VII.39
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether Title VII prohibited
intragroup discrimination based on tribal membership or simply allowed
discrimination for or against Indians as a protected group.40 In its holding that
discrimination based on tribal membership was not protected by the Indian
Exemption, the court of appeals agreed with the EEOC's position in its amicus
brief, that
the Indian Preference exemption is to authorize an employer to grant
preferences to all Indians... to permit the favoring of Indians over
non-Indians... [not] to permit employers to favor members of one
Indian tribe over another, let alone favor them over all other
Indians.4
. Procedural Background - E.E.O.c. v. Peabody Western Coal Company
A. Statement of Facts
Peabody Western Coal Company (Peabody) operates coal mines on the
Navajo and Hopi reservations in northeastern Arizona.42 Peabody's coal mines
are in operation pursuant to leases entered into with the tribes by Peabody's
predecessor-in-interest, Sentry Royal Company (Sentry).43 Sentry had entered
into two leases with the Navajo Nation. The first lease, entered into in 1964,
37. Id.
38. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
39. Dawavendewa 1, 154 F.3d at 1120.
40. Id. at 1119.
41. Id. at 1122.





allowed Sentry to mine on the Navajo reservation, and the second lease, entered
into in 1966, allowed for Sentry to mine on "the Navajo portion of land set
aside for joint use by the Navajo and Hopi Nations." Both of the leases
contain a clause requiring Peabody to give preference in employment to
members of the Navajo Nation. The 1964 lease provides in part that Peabody
"agrees to employ Navajo Indians when available in all positions for which, in
the judgment of [Peabody], they are qualified and that [Peabody] shall make a
special effort to work Navajo Indians into skilled, technical, and other higher
jobs in connection with [Peabody's] operations under this lease." '45 The 1966
lease contains a similar provision with an allowance for Peabody to extend the
Navajo employment preference to members of the Hopi Nation.' The language
of the Navajo employment preference clause has remained unchanged and
Peabody has not chosen to extend the employment preference to the members
of the Hopi Nation.47 The two leases, as well as subsequent amendments and
extensions, were approved by the Department of Interior (DOI) pursuant to the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA).48 Should the terms of the leases
be violated, the Navajo Nation and the DOI have the power to cancel the leases
after notice and a period to cure.4 9
On June 13,2001, this action was filed by the EEOC in the District Court for
the District of Arizona, claiming that Peabody unlawfully discriminated on the
"basis of national origin by implementing the Navajo employment
preference."5 The EEOC claims that Peabody refused to hire non-Navajo
Native Americans, Delbert Mariano and Thomas Sahu, members of the Hopi
Tribe, and Robert Koshiway, a member of the Otoe Tribe (now deceased), in
favor of members of the Navajo Nation.5 The EEOC contends that this
conduct is in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which prohibits







49. Id. at 776-77.
50. Id. at 777.
51. EEOCv. Peabody Western Coal Co. (Peabody1),No. 01-1050,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26483, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2002), overruled by Peabody I, 400 F.3d 774(9th Cir. 2005).
52. Peabody I, 400 F.3d at 777. The EEOC complaint also alleges that Peabody failed to
maintain records of applicants in violation of42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c), which requires employers
to "make and keep such records relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment
No. 1]
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In February 2002, Peabody moved for summary judgment and dismissal of
the action. 3 Peabody argued that the Navajo Nation was a "necessary and
indispensable party" to the suit which could not bejoined, thus Federal Rule 19
of Civil Procedure (Rule 19) mandated dismissal. 4
B. District Court Decision - Peabody I
The district court ruled in favor of the defendant, Peabody, on a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that "the Navajo Nation is a
necessary and indispensable party to this litigation and itsj oinder is not feasible
under Rule 19(b) because the EEOC is not empowered to bring this action
against the tribe,"" and the case presented a "nonjusticiable political
question."56
Title VII does not cover employers that are a "government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision," thus, the Navajo Nation, as a sovereign
government, is exempt from the statute.57 The district court rejected the
EEOC's argument that this limiting language applies only to a "respondent
government"" and not to non-employer Indian tribes. In a plain meaning
analysis of the statute, the district court held that only the Attorney General, and
not the EEOC, is authorized to join the Navajo Nation because it would be a
case "involving a government."59 The EEOC is not empowered to "name the
Indian tribes as defendants in a lawsuit alleging Title VII violations, no matter
what their role,"6 which precludes the EEOC from joining the Navajo Nation
under Rule 19. After a brief discussion of why the Navajo Nation was an
indispensable party to the litigation, the district court held that it was proper to
dismiss the action.6'
practices have been or are being committed." This paper focuses on the joinder issue under
Rule 19, thus, does not address the EEOC's record-keeping claim. It suffices to note that the
court in Peabody II vacated summary judgment on the EEOC's record keeping claim because
the district court did not address the issue in granting summary judgment to Peabody.
53. Id. at 778.
54. Id.
55. Peabody I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26483, at *18.
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
58. Peabody I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26483, at *23.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (stating that "[i]n the case of a respondent which is a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.., the Commission shall take no
further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action
against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court").
60. Peabody I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26483, at *30.




In an alternative holding, the district court determined that the EEOC's
position concerning the Navajo employment preference language in the lease
is at direct odds with that of the Secretary, creating a nonjusticiable political
question.62 The district court held that Peabody had presented credible evidence
showing that the original Navajo employment preference language in the lease
was required by the Secretary as a "condition of the leases." '63 Moreover, even
if the lease language had not been expressly required by the Secretary, the
district court determined that the BIA had a policy of "requiring or at least
approving Navajo Employment Preference provisions in Coal Leases executed
by private companies with the Navajo Nation." Because the EEOC asked the
court to invalidate the DOI approved Navajo employment preference language
in the lease, the court, citing Baker v. Carr,65 held that this would require an
initial policy determination not appropriate for judicial discretion and that any
determination would show a lack of respect for either the EEOC or the
Secretary and would be a cause for embarrassment between the departments."
C. Court of Appeals - Peabody 11
The court of appeals reversed in Peabody II and held that "where the EEOC
asserts a cause of action against Peabody and seeks no affirmative relief against
the Nation, joinder of the Nation under Rule 19 is not prevented by the fact that
the EEOC cannot state a cause of action against it.'6 7 Furthermore, because the
EEOC is an agency of the United States, the Navajo Nation cannot assert
sovereign immunity to block the EEOC's motion for joinder.68
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the Navajo Nation is
a necessary party to the suit.69 Should the EEOC prevail on its discrimination
claim, "declaratory and injunctive relief could be incomplete unless the Nation
is bound by res judicata... [which] will preclude the Nation from bringing a
collateral challenge to the judgment."7 The court noted that where an Indian
tribe has been found to be an indispensable party, "sovereign immunity has
62. Id. at *42-43.
63. Id. at *42.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *43 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
66. Id. at *42.
67. EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (Peabody I), 400 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2005).
68. Id. The court also reversed the district court's ruling that the case involved a
nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 784.
69. See id. at 780; Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.
(Dawavendewa 11), 276 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).
70. Peabody H1, 400 F.3d at 780.
No. 1]
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required dismissal of the case." 71 However, "even when Congress has not
specifically abrogated tribal immunity"72 an Indian tribe may not assert
sovereign immunity to "act as a shield against the United States."73 The EEOC
is an agency of the United States and therefore tribal immunity does not apply
to Title VII suits brought by the EEOC. The court rejected Peabody's argument
that Title VII expressly prohibits the EEOC from stating a direct claim against
the Navajo Nation, and should be prohibited from joining the Nation under
Rule 1 9.74 The court held that joining the Nation under Rule 19 for the "sole
purpose" 75 of effectuating complete relief between the parties and not to seek
any affirmative relief from the Nation is consistent with the Ninth Circuit, First
Circuit, and Supreme Court's reading ofjoinder under Rule 1 9.76
The court of appeals also reversed the district court's ruling that the issue
presented a nonjusticiable political question. The test for a political question
is based on the six factors laid down by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.77
The six factors are:
[1 ] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
71. Id. at 781 (citing Dawavendewa 11, 276 F.3d at 1163; American Greyhound Racing, Inc.
v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1027 (9th Cir. 2002)).
72. Peabody I, 400 F.3d at 781.
73. Id. (quoting United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1987)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 783.
76. See id. at 781; see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356
(1977) (holding that although the union was not liable for discrimination, it must remain in the
litigation so that complete relief may be afforded the victims of the employer's discrimination);
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that private parties
can bejoined alongside agencies in suits brought to enforce National Environmental Policy Act
and Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 although these statutes do not
authorize causes of action against private parties); EEOC v. Union Independiente de la
Autoridad de Acueductos, 279 F.3d 49, 52 (1 st Cir. 2002) (condoning without comment the
EEOC's joinder of a Puerto Rican governmental employer "to ensure that complete relief...
was available").




already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.78
Of the six factors, the district court had ruled that the "third, fourth and sixth
Baker factors were implicated by the EEOC's claim., 79 The court of appeals
held that, although the "EEOC is challenging a lease that the DOI has approved,
the district court was not called upon to make an 'initial policy determination'
[implicating the third Baker factor]" 80 because determining "whether and how
Title VII applies is a matter of statutory interpretation"'" and only involves
applying previously determined congressional policy determinations.
Furthermore, being asked to rule upon the legality of the DOI's lease does not
implicate the fourth Baker factor, as courts "regularly review the actions of
federal agencies to determine whether they comport with applicable law."82
Finally, the court of appeals held that the sixth Baker factor was not implicated
by the mere existence of a "controvers[y] between departments of the federal
government." 3
I1. Statutory Background
A. Coal Lease Agreements and Navajo Preference in Employment Act
It is unclear whether the Navajo Nation, Sentry, or the Secretary is
responsible for the language in the coal leases requiring a Navajo employment
preference. However, the district court made a factual finding, initially disputed
by the EEOC, that the Secretary had required the Navajo employment
preference." Based on the testimony of Peabody's former general counsel and
the general policies of the Secretary and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the court
held that there was ample evidence that the Secretary "required the Navajo
Employment Preference as a condition of the leases. 8 5
78. Id.
79. Peabody II, 400 F.3d at 784.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(holding that when a determination requires applying traditional rules of statutory construction,
the political question doctrine does not bar a challenge to the Secretary of Commerce)).
83. Id.
84. EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (Peabody 1), No. 0 1-1050, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26483, at *42 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2002), overruled by Peabody II, 400 F.3d 774.
85. Id.; see Response Brief for Appellee at 41, EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.
(Peabody 1), No. 01-1050, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26483 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2002) ("The
No. 1]
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Nonetheless, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) requires that lands
within an Indian reservation or otherwise under federal jurisdiction "may, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by
authority of the tribal council or other authorized spokesmen for such
Indians," 6 and the Secretary shall "perform any and all acts and make such
rules and regulations as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of [the IMLA] into full force and effect.""7 Due to the fact that the
Secretary approved the lease language, including the Navajo employment
preference, it must be assumed that the Secretary deemed that by including the
Navajo employment preference, the interests of the Indians have been served.
Contemporaneously with the Navajo employment preference provisions of
the lease agreements, the Navajo Tribal Council approved the employment
preference"8 which is in accord with the Navajo Preference in Employment Act
(NPEA)."9 The NPEA states that "[a]ll employers doing business within the
territorial jurisdiction [or near the boundaries] of the Navajo Nation, or engaged
in any contract with the Navajo Nation, shall [g]ive preference in employment
to Navajos." ° Given the strong interest of the Navajo Nation in promoting
employment on the reservation, in particular among members of the Navajo
Nation, it is clear that the Secretary would see fit to include or approve of the
inclusion of a Navajo employment preference in any lease agreement between
the Navajo Nation and third party contractors.
B. Rule 19, Title VII and the Navajo Nation
In order to ensure complete relief to the plaintiff, Federal Rule 19 of Civil
Procedure (Rule 1 9)determines whether a party to an action is indispensable. 9'
Rule 19 requires that any person who is amenable to service and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of subject matterjurisdiction shall be joined provided
"(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties," or (2) the person has an interest relating to the action and
language included in the leases that is at issue between [Peabody] and the Navajo Nation
regarding the preferential employment of Navajos was not only originally drafted by the
Secretary of the Interior, but the Secretary of the Interior required that the language be
included.").
86. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2000).
87. Id.
88. Resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council (Dec. 11, 1968) (No. CD-108-68).
89. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 15, §§ 601-619 (1995).
90. Id. § 604.
91. Dawavendewav. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement& Power Dist. (Dawavendewa




adjudication of the action in the person's absence may "(i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring" inconsistent
obligations as a result of the claimed interest. 92 If a party is determined
indispensable under Rule 19(a) then the court shall determine "whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties"
before the court, or whether the action should be dismissed. 93
As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, the inquiry under Rule 19 involves first
determining whether a party is necessary, that is, whether in that party's
absence, complete relief can be granted to the plaintiff.94 The alternative
inquiry is whether the party "claims a legally protected interest in the subject
of the suit" such that adjudicating the claim in its absence will (1) "impair or
impede its ability to protect that interest;" or (2) put the plaintiff at risk of
"multiple or inconsistent" legal obligations connected with that interest. 95
Prior to Peabody, the most recent case in the Ninth Circuit addressing a Rule
19 joinder issue involving an Indian tribe was Dawavendewa II, the
continuation of Dawavendewa L Dawavendewa I was remanded by the court
of appeals and on remand the district court held that the Navajo Nation was a
necessary and indispensable party to the litigation and dismissed the action. On
appeal, the court discussed the lease agreement, which required Salt River to
apply the Navajo employment preference. If Dawavendewa prevailed on his
Title VII claim and received injunctive relief in the form of employment at the
Navajo Generating Station, Salt River would be forced to choose between
upholding the terms of the lease agreement and refusing to hire Dawavendewa
in violation of the injunction or hiring him, and not enforcing the Navajo
employment preference, in direct violation of the terms of the lease.96
Accordingly, the court held that the Navajo Nation was a necessary party.97
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
93. Id. at 19(b).
94. Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Hines v.
Grand Casino of La., 140 F. Supp. 2d 701, 705 (W.D. La. 2001) (holding in a Title VII sex
discrimination claim against a casino owned by the Tunica-Biloxi Indians of Louisiana "implicit
in Rule 19 is the requirement that the plaintiff have a viable cause of action against the party
to be joined as a defendant"). Because Title VII exempts Indian Tribes from the definition of
"employer," the tribe may not be joined. The court allowed the Title VII claim to proceed
against the casino without the Tribe's participation.
95. DawavendewafI,276F.3dat 1155.
96. Id. at 1155-56.
97. Id. at 1156.
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Under the alternative inquiry, the court noted that the Navajo Nation had a
"legally protected interest in its contact rights with [Salt River]." 95 Navajo
Nation bargained for and entered into a lease agreement with Salt River which
included a Navajo employment preference. The benefit to the Nation is in the
form of employment for its members and without the lease containing a Navajo
employment preference, the "Navajo Nation leadership would never have
approved this lease agreement." In explaining the contours of the legally
protected rights under the lease agreement with Salt River, the court noted that
the economic interest of the Navajo Nation under the lease "may be grievously
impaired by a decision rendered in [the Navajo Nation's] absence."'"
Furthermore, a judgment rendered in the absence of the Navajo Nation would
impact the Navajo Nation's ability to negotiate contracts with third parties,
undercutting the Nation's sovereign interest in self-govemance.' The Navajo
Nation's economic and sovereign interest would be implicated if the claim was
adjudicated without the Navajo Nation joined as a party making the Navajo
Nation a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(2)(I).' 2
Once the Ninth Circuit held that the Navajo Nation was a necessary party,
it made an inquiry into whether the Navajo Nation could feasibly be joined as
a party. After pronouncing that the Navajo Nation was a necessary and
indispensable party to the litigation enjoying sovereign immunity from suit by
Dawavendewa, the court noted that Dawavendewa had a number of other
options, one of which is filing an action in conjunction with the EEOC. The
court stated that "because no principle of law differentiates a federal agency
such as the EEOC from the United States itself, tribal sovereign immunity does
not apply in suits brought by the EEOC,"'°3 leaving the door open for the EEOC
and the representative plaintiffs in the Peabody case.
98. Id. (citing Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that the Hopi Tribe was a necessary and indispensable party to a claim brought by an individual
challenging the terms of a lease between the Hopi Tribe and Peabody on the grounds that the
Tribe was a signatory to the lease)).










A. Political Question Issue in Peabody 11
The political question doctrine is about not adjudicating issues that the
Constitution reserves for either the legislative or the executive branch. Under
the U.S. Constitution, Congress is empowered to "regulate commerce... with
the Indian tribes."' °4 The DOI is, among its other duties, charged with dealing
with Indian affairs. The creation of the DOI and its incorporation of the present
BIA is not constitutionally reserved for the executive branch, but rather,
spawned by an act of Congress.
Likewise, the EEOC is not an executive agency but rather an independent
commission, created by Congress with the passage of Title VII, charged with
interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination
acts. 15
With respect to the Ninth Circuit's decision determining that the Navajo
employment preference in the Peabody lease and EEOC's claim of national
origin discrimination does not give rise to a political question, the court is
correct. The regulation of Indian affairs and the abolition of discrimination via
enforcement of Title VII both have their constitutional genesis in the legislative
branch. Although the executive branch is responsible for appointing the
Secretary of the DOI and the Commissioners of the EEOC, the appointment
power was legislated by Congress and their appointments are by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.° 6 Conflicts which arise between independent
commissions and executive agencies in the carrying out of Congress' legislative
will do not give rise to a political question, but rather call for judicial oversight.
As the Peabody II court noted, the EEOC is simply asking the court to
determine the strictures of Title VII, as it applies to Peabody; a task of statutory
interpretation involving "simply implementing policy determinations Congress
has already made."'0 7 Should the result of the judicial intervention be deemed
inappropriate, Congress is well within its power to remedy the problem it was
responsible for legislatively creating.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
105. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -5 (2000).
106. Id. § 2000e-4(a).
107. EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (Peabody I), 400 F.3d 774, 784 (9th Cir. 2005).
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B. Interference with Tribal Sovereign Power and DOI Drafted Lease
Provision
The court in Peabody II and the EEOC both acknowledge that the EEOC
cannot assert a claim against the Navajo Nation as a respondent under Title VII,
but the court nonetheless held that the EEOC may join the Navajo Nation if the
"sole purpose" of the joinder is to effectuate full relief between the parties."°8
The court did not address with any certainty what "full relief" might entail. The
court opined about the necessity of joining the Navajo Nation as a party to
prevent Peabody, should the EEOC prevail, from being subject to a collateral
attack on any possible injunction against using the Navajo employment
preference in hiring, as required by the lease agreement."° It appears then that
the Ninth Circuit believes, should the EEOC prevail, that the Navajo
employment preference provision of the lease agreement between Peabody and
the Navajo Nation should be invalidated, removing the Navajo employment
preference from the lease.
From an anti-discrimination standpoint, and from the standpoint of the
representative plaintiffs in Peabody II, the preferable relief would be removal
of the Navajo employment preference from the lease agreement, falling back
on the general "on or near the reservation" exemption allowing general
preferencing of Indians in employment in its stead. This would facilitate the
goals of Title VII's prohibition on national origin discrimination in general and
would be consistent with Congress' intent of fighting relatively high
unemployment of Indians living on or near a reservation, in including the
Indian Exemption in Title VII. However, this solution runs contrary to two
other interests in the case: (1) the tribal sovereign power of the Navajo Nation
and (2) the approval of the lease language and the Navajo employment
preference by the Secretary.
The Navajo Nation, notwithstanding the lease agreement, has the NPEA,"0
which requires that "all employers doing business within the territorial
jurisdiction [or near the boundaries] of the Navajo Nation, or engaged in any
108. Id. at 783 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 780 ("The judgment will not bind the Navajo Nation in the sense that it will
directly order the Nation to perform, or refrain from performing, certain acts... [but] the
Nation could possibly initiate further action to enforce the employment preference against
Peabody, even though that preference would have been held illegal in this litigation. Peabody
would then be, like the defendant in Dawavendewa II, between the proverbial rock and a hard
place -- comply with the injunction prohibiting the hiring preference policy or comply with the
lease requiring it.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
110. NAVAJONATION CODE tit. 15, §§ 601-619 (1995).
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contract with the Navajo Nation, shall give preference in employment to
Navajos.""' Even if the Navajo employment preference clause of the lease
agreement were severed, the NPEA would require Peabody to give preference
in employment to Navajos regardless of the illegality of the lease provision,
because Peabody is engaged in mining operations within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. The NPEA is enforceable against Peabody
in Navajo Tribal Court. In 1990, the Ninth Circuit, in FMC v. Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes," 2 applied Montana v. United States"3 to hold that Indian tribes
could enforce tribal employment "preferential hiring laws against non-Indian
businesses."" 4 Under the holding in Montana, there are two circumstances in
which Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power over non-Indians on their
reservations:
[1] A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, 'or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. [2] A tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 5
Peabody is subject to tribal jurisdiction under the first Montana factor. It is
clear that Peabody is, as the Ninth Circuit noted, "between the proverbial rock
and a hard place...,,',6 Unless the injunction also covers the NPEA, which
seems doubtful as the NPEA has not been raised as an issue in this case, the
Navajo Nation could seek to enforce the NPEA against Peabody." 7
111. Id. § 604.
112. 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
113. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
114. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d at 1314-15.
115. Id. at 1314 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (citations omitted)).
116. EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.(Peabody fl), 400 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted).
117. Indeed, it appears that the Nation may have already gone down this road. The district
court judge in Peabody I noted that "[w]hile this lawsuit has been pending, Peabody Coal has
been subject to legal action by the Navajo Nation seeking to enforce the Navajo Preference in
Employment Act, 15 NNC § 601, et seq," EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (Peabody 1),
No. 01-1050, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26483, at *15 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2002), overruled by
Peabody II, 400 F.3d 774. However, it is unclear from this brief quotation, which is all the
district court affords us, whether the suit has been brought in federal court or in tribal court and
whether it has been resolved.
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Should the EEOC prevail, the Navajo Nation, being joined in the suit, would
be prohibited by res judicata from collaterally attacking any injunction against
the Navajo employment preference. Peabody, on the other hand, would be
enjoined from discriminating on the basis of tribal membership based on the
lease provision. The Navajo Nation would be barred from enforcing the lease
provision against Peabody because of the federal injunction. Being barred from
enforcing the lease provision would have the same effect as rewriting Navajo
Nation law, removing the NPEA altogether. This appears to be the result
desired by the EEOC. The EEOC has specifically requested as much in its
initial complaint, praying that the district court: "Grant a permanent injunction
enjoining Peabody, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active
concert or participation with it, from engaging in discrimination on the basis of
national origin."" 8 As the Peabody I court observed, "the EEOC suggests,
however, that the Navajo Nation is free only to require that a private company
such as Peabody Coal operating on their reservations adopt hiring preferences
for all Native Americans living on or near the reservations, but not to adopt
hiring preferences applicable to Navajos only."' '9
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Peabody H1, should the EEOC prevail on
its Title VII claim on remand, sets the stage for a form of de facto federal
judicial rewriting of the Navajo Nation Code. Due to the precarious financial
and employment situation on the Navajo reservation, it would be impossible for
the Nation to refuse to do business with non-Indian employers. The only viable
option would be to rescind the NPEA or amend the NPEA to include a
preference for all Indians, rather than just for Navajos. This result would run
contrary to the notion of Indian self-determination and undercut the authority
and autonomy of the Navajo Nation in running its own affairs and managing in
a manner that is most appropriate for its own members.
In the passage of Title VII, Congress carved out a small number of very
important exemptions. One of these exemptions is the Indian Exemption,
exempting Indian tribes from the definition of employer for the purposes of
Title VII.120 Although Congress may not have contemplated this exemption
allowing intragroup discrimination as in Peabody, Congress did intend to allow
the Indian tribes to be self-determinative. One component of self-determination
is the power to legislate and to enforce such legislation on tribal lands. In this
case, the Navajo Nation has determined that it is in the best interests of its
members to enforce the NPEA on the reservation in order to promote
118. Id. at *37.
119. Id. at *38.




employment and create job opportunities for the members of the Nation. The
importance of on reservation employment opportunities has been noted by
commentators:
One reason that so many Tribal members work for Tribal employers
is that federal law [including Title VII] permits Indian Tribes to
initiate Indian preference policies that allow Tribes to grant a hiring
and employment preference to Indians. This preference extends to
businesses operating on or near an Indian reservation. Many Tribes
also extend a preference to Tribal Members over non-Member
Indians. 21
The consequence of non-immunity from suit for sovereign choices relating to
employment and employment preferences is an invasion of the Nation's
sovereign interest in self-govemance.'22 Because of the consequences of an
injunction against the Navajo employment preference clause in the lease for the
NPEA, it appears that the EEOC is in fact seeking some form of affirmative
relief against the Navajo Nation, abolition of NPEA, and the Ninth Circuit has
sanctioned this end-run on the Indian Exemption in Title VII under the guise of
an innocuous Rule 19 joinder.
The second interest affected by this decision is that of the Secretary, who
approved the terms of the lease agreement between Peabody and the Navajo
Nation. The district court made a factual finding that the Secretary expressly
required the Navajo employment preference language to be included in the
lease as a condition of approval.'23 Regardless of the accuracy of the district
court's finding, the Secretary approved of the lease agreement which included
the Navajo employment preference clause. This indicated that the Secretary,
although not charged with interpreting Title VII and the contours of national
origin discrimination, made the determination that it was in the best interests of
the Navajo Nation to have a Navajo employment preference clause in the lease.
121. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law Enigma, Tribal
Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 273,284 (2005).
122. Id. at 317-18 ("Sovereign immunity prevents depletion of valuable common resources
and protects against litigation interfering with the operation of the Tribe.").
123. EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (Peabody 1), No. 01-1050, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26483, at *15 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2002), overruled by EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal
Co.(Peabody I), 400 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2005).
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C. A Possible Legal Defense on Remand
It is important to note that the merits of the EEOC's Title VII claim against
Peabody and the Navajo Nation have yet to be tested in court. The court in
Dawavendewa I, held that a plaintiffalleging tribal membership discrimination
could state a claim of national origin discrimination under Title VII for which
relief could be granted. The court did not pass on the merits ofDawavendewa's
claim. Dawavendewa's case was later dismissed by the court of appeals in
Dawavendewa II, leaving the issue of the merits unresolved. On remand,
Peabody and the Navajo Nation have the opportunity to test a defense against
the discrimination claim in order to preserve the NPEA.
In appropriate cases, federal law will yield to treaty rights or federal policy
of Indian self-governance. As expressed by the Supreme Court in Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, "[t]he Indian Nations did not seek out the United States
and agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-length transaction."' 24 One of
the consequences flowing from this is that the Supreme Court has often held
that treaties with the Indians should be interpreted "liberally in favor of the
Indians," such that any doubtful expressions in them should be resolved in their
favor. 25 The 1868 Navajo Treaty,2 6 which established the Navajo Nation's
territory and the right to exclude individuals, has been used as a shield against
federal law successfully before in federal court. In Donovan v. Navajo Forest
Prods. Indus.,'27 the Tenth Circuit held that the Navajo Nation had not
relinquished its sovereign power under the 1868 Navajo Treaty nor had
Congress intended to abrogate the treaty with the passage of OSHA. 28 As a
result, the court held that the treaty barred the application of OSHA to the tribal
owned Navajo Forest Products Industries. 1
29
Peabody and the Navajo Nation might be able to assert the 1868 Treaty as
a defense against the EEOC's attack on the NPEA. It is clear from the Indian
Exemption in Title VII that Congress did not intend to abrogate tribal immunity
in the passage of the Act. Congress' intent in including the Indian Exemption
and the "on or near the reservation" exemption in Title VII relates to tribal self-
124. 397 U.S. 620, 630 (1970).
125. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band ofChippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,200 (1999); see also
Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
126. Navajo Treaty, U.S.-Navajo Tribe, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
127. 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982).
128. Id. at 712.
129. Id. But see Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that absent a federal treaty between the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and the United
States, OSHA regulations do apply to a tribally owned and operated farm).
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governance. Peabody and the Navajo Nation might be able to argue that self-
governance in accordance with the 1868 Navajo Treaty should take precedent
over Title VII's ban on national origin discrimination and allow the Navajo
Nation to provide for its people. The Navajo Nation has expressed this
sentiment before: "As a sovereign nation, it was necessary to bargain water,
coal, land, and the environment for jobs for Navajo people. Without Navajo
preference in hiring in the lease agreement, the Navajo Nation leadership would
never have approved this lease agreement.'
' 30
V. Conclusion
The battle in Peabody II is over but the dust has yet to settle. Peabody has
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which will be considered in conference
by the Supreme Court on January 20, 2006. Yet, should the result stand as is,
it is clear that the EEOC is seeking to nullify the NPEA. If the EEOC should
prevail on its claim, it will succeed in obtaining an injunction against the
NPEA. Should the EEOC fail, the fight might continue, either in the appellate
courts or again with the next test case brought by the EEOC to strike down the
NPEA or other tribes' tribal employment preference laws. If Congress is
serious about providing a level playing field for the Indian tribes and assuring
their right to self-governance, then Congress must intervene by extending the
Indian Exemption to tribal employment preferences, in accordance with local
tribal law, used by non-tribal employers on or near the reservation.
130. Briefofthe Navajo Nation as Amicus Curiae November 9,2006 Supporting Defendant-
Appellee, Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.
(DawavendewaI1), 276 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-16787), 2001 WL 34095334.
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